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Low: Securities Law

SECURITIES LAW

SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION v.
RIND: SEC CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
ARE NOT SUBJECT TO STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Securities & Exchange Commission v. Rind,l the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, ruling on an
issue of first impression,2 held that civil enforcement actions3
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter "SEC") are not subject to statute of limitations restrictions. 4 Additionally, the court ruled that no right to a jury
trial attaches in SEC civil enforcement actions seeking
disgorgement of illicit profits. 5
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 15, 1990, the SEC filed a civil enforcement
action in connection with the collapse of ZZZZ Best Company.6

1. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 439
(1993) (per Wallace, J., the other panel members were Trott, J. and Nelson, J.).
2. [d. at 1488.
3. Section 20 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 !hereinafter "1933 Act" and "1934 Act," respectively),
authorize the SEC's use of the civil courts to enforce Act provisions. 15 U.S.C. §
77t(b) (1988), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988).
4. [d. at 1493.
5. [d. Disgorgement deprives a wrongdoer of illegally obtained profits, often
compensating victims for losses. [d. at 1490.
6. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
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In the action, the SEC named Maurice Rind, along with thirteen others, as defendants. 7 The complaint was brought under
Section 20 of the Securities Act of 1933 (hereinafter "1933
Act") and Section 21 of the Securities Act of 1934 (hereinafter II
1934 Act").8 The SEC alleged violations of various reporting
and recordkeeping provisions of the 1933 Act, 9 the 1934 ActIo
and various SEC Rules. 11
The SEC alleged that Rind violated securities regulations
by concocting a fraudulent transaction which vastly overstated
the assets of ZZZZ Best Company in the company's registration
statements. 12 The alleged overstatement enabled the company
to raise millions of dollars in capital. 13 According to the complaint, Rind personally received at least $700,000 for his part
in the fraud. l4
The SEC sought disgorgement of Rind's unlawful gains
and a permanent injunction prohibiting his further violation of
federal securities provisions. 15 Rind moved for judgment on
the pleadings, arguing that, under Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson,16 the SEC action was barred
by the statute of limitations. 17 The district court denied Rind's
439 (1993).
7. [d. Prior to trial, the thirteen other defendants either defaulted or consented to judgments, leaving Rind as the sole defendant in the case. [d. at 1488.
8. [d.

9. [d. Rind was charged with violating Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, which
forbids a seller of securities to use misleading statements, fraud or deceit in interstate transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988).
10. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1488. Rind was charged with violating Section lO(b) of
the 1934 Act, which prohibits the use of misleading statements, deceptive schemes
,or fraudulent practices by persons buying or selling securities in interstate commerce, and by national securities exchanges. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
11. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1488. Specifically, Rules 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5),
12b-20 (17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20), 13a-13 (17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13), and 13b-1 (17
C.F.R. § 240.13b-1).
12. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1488.
13. [d.
14. [d.
15. [d.

16. 501 U.S. 350 (1991). In Lampf, the Supreme Court held that an action
brought by private investors under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act was subject to a
one-year statute of limitations with a three-year period of repose (i.e., one year
from the date fraud is detected, and three years from when it occurred) [d. at
364.
17. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1488. Rind argued that July, 1987, the date ZZZZ Best
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motion and granted the SEC's motion to strike Rind's statute
of limitations defenses. 18 The district court also granted the
SEC's motion to strike Rind's demand for a jury trial, on the
grounds that disgorgement is an equitable remedy. 19 Rind
appealed these rulings interlocutorily, and the court certified
the statute of limitations and the jury trial questions for appeaL 20 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted permission to appeal. 21
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Rind, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that no statute of limitations applies to civil enforcement
actions brought by the SEC. 22 The court also held that the
right to a jury trial does not attach in actions where the SEC
sues for disgorgement of illegal profits. 23
A.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In addressing the issue of whether SEC civil enforcement
actions are subject to a statute of limitations, the Ninth Circuit
considered the Supreme Court's ruling in Lampf,24 and held
that Lampf was inapplicable. 25 The court then determined
that, in light of Congress' intene6 and public policy interests,27 a statute of limitations period does not apply to SEC

Company filed for bankruptcy, was the latest date the fraud can be said to have
occurred. The SEC's action was filed more than three years later, in August, 1990.
[d. at 1488.
18. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1488.
19. [d.
20. [d. An interlocutory appeal is one brought prior to final adjucation of a

case "which is not determinable of the controversy, but which is necessary for a
suitable adjudication of the merits." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 815 (6th ed. 1990).
21. [d.

22. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
439 (1993).
23. [d. at 1493.
24. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350
(1991).
25. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993).
26. [d.
27. [d at 1492.
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enforcement actions. 28
1. Lampf Applies Only to Private Actions Implied Under

Section 10(b)
Responding to Rind's assertion that, under Lampf, the
SEC is bound by a statute of limitations period when it sues
for disgorgement of profits, the Ninth Circuit determined that
Lampf is not dispositive in this case.29 The court stated that
Lampf applies only to private actions implied under Section
10(b) of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934.30
Lampf involved an action brought by a group of investors
under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 3t Such private 10(b) actions were not expressly created by Congress, but were later
implied by the courtS. 32 The issue in Lampf was whether a
statute of limitations should control private actions implied
under Section 10(b).33 The Lampf Court noted that the policy
considerations underlying Congress' decision to impose time
limitations on other private actions expressly authorized in the
1934 Act would also apply to the private actions implied by the
courtS. 34 Therefore, the Lampf Court held that the same restrictions placed by Congress on the expressly created private
rights of actions would also control private actions implied
under Section 10(b).35
In Rind, however, the Ninth Circuit refused to extend the
Lampf opinion to public claims brought under Section 20 of the
1933 Act and Section 21 of the 1934 Act. 36 The court noted
the differences in the policy considerations underlying private
and public actions. 37 Private actions were created to protect

28. Id.
29. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993).
30. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1490.
31. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 353.
32. Id. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bakers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n.9 (1971).
33. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 353.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1490.
37. Id.
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individual investors from stock manipulations schemes and to
compensate them by restoring losses. 3s In contrast, civil enforcement actions are concerned with deterring wrongdoers
and depriving them of their unlawful profits. 39 The court noted that these social policies are "independent of the claims of
individual investors,,40 and that, despite the monetary aspect
of disgorgement, its purpose, to remove the incentive for violating securities regulations, is public in nature. 41 The court concluded that, because the interests are different for public actions, the time limits extended to implied private rights by the
Supreme Court in Lampf, do not apply to civil enforcement actions brought by the SEC. 42

2. Congress Did Not Intend for a Statute of Limitations to
Apply to SEC Enforcement Actions
The Ninth Circuit determined that Congress did not intend for SEC enforcement actions to be subject to time restrictions. 43 The court pointed to the structure of the securities
laws as evidence of this intention. 44 The private actions expressly created in the 1933 and 1934 Acts are all bound by
express statutes of limitation. 45 In contrast, Congress imposed
no time restrictions on SEC enforcement actions it authorized. 46 As a result, the Rind court determined that the structure of the securities laws indicates that Congress deliberately
refrained from imposing time restrictions on SEC civil enforcement actions. 47 .
Recognizing that Congress has often refrained from imposing time restrictions on federal claims it has created, the Rind
court considered how the Supreme Court has dealt with cases

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1490.
42. Id.
43. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993).
44.Id.
45. Id.

46. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) and U.S.C. §78u(d) (1988).
47. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1990.
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arising from those claims. 48 The Court has held that generally, when Congress is silent as to a statute of limitations, a
court should borrow the limitation period provided in an analogous rule. 49 This doctrine, however, is not applied in cases
where the government sues to protect a public right or interest. 50 The underlying justification for exempting federal
claims from the general rule is that the public should not suffer due to the failure of public officials to enforce laws in a
timely manner. 51 Civil enforcement claims are brought by the
SEC to protect the public interest by ensuring the integrity
and fairness of the capital markets. 52 Therefore, the Rind
court held that Congress did not intend for these actions to be
subject to statute of limitations restrictions. 53
Finally, the court noted that the nature of SEC enforcement claims indicates that Congress did not intend for these
claims to be time-barred. 54 The court relied on Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. EEOC,55 where the Supreme Court refused to place
time restrictions on employment discrimination claims brought
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC,,).56 The Court stated that to do so would "frustrate
or interfere with th.e implementation of national policies."57
The Court noted that the EEOC was required by law to attempt to settle potential claims before suing. 58 Furthermore,
the EEOC faced a severe backlog of cases when Congress first
authorized EEOC enforcement actions. 59 These two factors
indicated to the Court that Congress could not have intended

48. [d.
49. 1d. (citing Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323-24 (1989)
(holding that claims brought under 101(a)(2) of Title I of the federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 are governed by statute of limitations restrictions contained in applicable state personal injury statutes». 1d. at
323.
50. U.S. v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940).
51. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1490 (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. U.S., 304 U.S. 126,
132 (1938».
52. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1491.
53. 1d.
54. 1d.
55. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
56. 1d. at 372.
57. 1d. at 367.
58. 1d. at 368.
59. Id. at 369-71.
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for the EEOC to be subject to stringent time constraints. 6o
Similarly, the Rind court stated that the nature of SEC
enforcement actions indicates that Congress did not intend for
them to be subject to a statute of limitations. 61 Investigations
of securities laws violations are often arduous and time-consuming. 62 The SEC often attempts to avoid litigation by settling claims administratively, a process which requires considerable time. 63 Furthermore, enforcement actions may involve
multiple parties and complex transactions, and fraud is often
difficult to detect. 64 The Rind court noted all of these factors
and concluded that the nature of SEC enforcement actions
indicates that Congress could not have intended to subject
them to strict time restrictions. 65
B. JURY TRIAL

The Ninth Circuit joined the Second Circuit66 in holding
that the right to a jury trial does not attach to SEC civil enforcement actions seeking disgorgement of unlawful profits. 67
Noting the settled rule that no jury trial attaches to purely
injunctive actions brought by the SEC,68 the court extended
the rule to include enforcement actions seeking disgorgement
of profits. 69
The court based its ruling on the fact that, despite its
monetary nature, disgorgement of profits has been held to
constitute an equitable remedy.70 In Securities and Exchange

60. Occidental, 432 U.S. at 372.

61. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1492.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978). In
Commonwealth, the Second Circuit, characterizing disgorgement of profits as an
exercise of the court's discretion in preventing unjust enrichment, ruled that no
right to a jury trial existed in an SEC enforcement action seeking disgorgement of
profits. [d. at 95.
67. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1493 (9th Cir. 1993).
68. [d.
69. [d.
70. [d.
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Comm'n v. Clark,71 the Ninth Circuit characterized
disgorgement of profits as injunctive in nature. 72 Also, the
Supreme Court has noted that disgorgement actions are equitable in nature. 73
Finally, the court cited the similarity between
disgorgement and the more traditional equitable remedy of
restitution. 74 Because the right to jury trial guaranteed by the
Seventh Amendmenf5 does not attach in equitable actions,
the court held that a wrongdoer charged under an SEC
disgorgement action is not entitled to a jury tria1. 76
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit held that civil enforcement claims
brought by the SEC are not subject to statute of limitations
restrictions. The court based its decision on the important public policies underlying enforcement claims, the intent of Congress as evidenced by the structure of the securities laws, and
the complex nature of SEC enforcement claims. In addition,
the Rind court held that, due to the equitable nature of
disgorgement, a defendant's right to a jury trial does not attach in SEC civil enforcement actions which seek disgorgement
of profits.

Joan E. Low'

71. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
72. [d. at 453.
73. See Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,
570 (1990).
74. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1493.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
76. Rind, 991 F.2d at 1493.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996.
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